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THIRD WORLD TRADE PARTNERSHIP: 
SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY VS. 
NATIONAL EXTRATERRITORIAL 
ANTITRUST - A PLEA FOR 
''HARMONIZED'' REGIONALISM 
Wo!fgang Fikentscher* 
I. THE ISSUE 
That "Third World countries" should receive the assistance of the "in-
dustrialized nations" in increasing the level of their economic development 
is a matter beyond dispute. Yet the years following the "economic decade" 
of the 1970's have made apparent a crisis in the concepts underlying this 
philosophy of Third World assistance. The nature of this crisis has not yet 
been fully ascertained, and the following text does not undertake that task. 
Rather, it starts from the general feeling among experts involved in one way 
or another with "development aid" that the paths so far followed and the 
methods so far applied should be more or less radically reassessed. 1 
One aspect of this reassessment relates to the problem of what body 
should, in the last resort, be the "primary agent" for determining the legal 
rules of development. The following discus~tries to make a contribu-
tion to this part of the general problem. Until recently it was commonly 
accepted that the United Nations should be the principal initiator, the clear-
ing house, the "primary agent" as it has been called, for international devel-
opment programs, and that UN member states should, as part of their 
membership duties, follow and elaborate these programs, drafted under 
UN supervision, by adopting appropriate policies at the national level. 
Various UN agencies and bodies have drafted codes of conduct designed to 
furnish guidelines (if not true rules oflaw) for the development activities of 
both states and private enterprise.2 The most spectacular initiative in the 
framework of UN-centered Third World trade partnership is the idea of 
supranational authorities equipped with binding administrative powers, 
such as the Seabed Authority provided for by the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111).3 Part II of this paper 
• Professor of Law, University of Munich; External Member, Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law, Munich. Dr. jur., Uni-
versity of Munich; LL.M., University of Michigan. - Ed. 
l. See sources cited in note 35 i,ifra. 
2. For surveys of this UN material, see K. GREWLICH, TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN A 
NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 117-22 (1980); Fikentscher, United Nations Codes of Conduct: 
New Paths in International Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 577 (1982); see also sources cited in notes 
11, 20 & 34 i,ifra. 
3. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 
reprinted in 21 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 1261-354 (1982). Recent developments concerning 
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attempts to raise some criticisms of this approach.4 
Although reliance on UN bodies and agencies for determining the legal 
rules of development has its drawbacks, who, if not the UN, should be the 
"primary agent"? Can legislative and administrative activities of the "sov-
ereign and equal" nation-states be of any help, providing the necessary 
remedies to overcome the crisis in Third World development? The often 
narrow self-interest of nation-states seems to point to a negative answer. 
Yet the industrialized western-style democracies govern themselves by way 
of a traditional constitutional system of checks and balances. The public 
control of private and state enterprises in general, and antitrust laws in par-
ticular, are merely a part of this system of separated powers. So it may be 
asked whether extraterritorial antitrust law (as a prominent example of 
public control of enterprises that act extraterritorially) can be used as an 
instrument of Third World assistance. This question may seem novel, even 
surprising, and will be discussed in Part III. 5 
Given the international impact of national extraterritorial public control 
of economic activity and expansion, however, national approaches cannot 
stand alo!1e. This leads to a call for international harmonization of national 
extraterritorial public control, as mentioned and encouraged in some recent 
UN codes of conduct. These patterns of international cooperation, includ-
ing adjustment of those national economic laws having extraterritorial im-
pact, need not be conceived of as worldwide, and indeed, should not be so 
conceived. Instead of pressing for supranational authorities acting world-
wide under UN auspices (and thus hampered ideologically by the three-
groups system6), regional entities for the coordination of extraterritorial le-
gal and administrative activities, like those in the antitrust area, could pro-
duce a more meaningful and effective attempt to realize third-world trade 
partnership. Some remarks on this recently emerged "mini-treaty ap-
proach" will be made in Part IV.7 
this ambitious project are commented on in Jaenicke, Die Dritte Seerechtsko,!ferenz der Ver-
einlen Nalionen, 36 NJW 1936 (1983); Platzl5der, Die Seerechlsenlwicklung aus deulscher Sichl, 
SPEKTRUM DER WISSENSCHAFT, May 1983, at 36. 
4. Part II is an unpublished co=ent, slightly revised here, which was contributed by the 
author at a conference organized by the Institute of International Studies, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, on the topic Whal should American Policy be on the LPw of the Sea?, June 5-6, 
1981. 
5. Part III is a condensed version of a paper published in German: Enllflicklungshi(fe oder 
Expansionskontrolle? Rechtspolitische Uberlegungen zu Antitrust und Technologielransfer, 1983 
GRUR INT. 497 (this issue, edited by F.-K. Beier, G. Schricker, W. Fikentscher & R. Krasser, 
was entitled BEITRAGE ZUM GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ, URHEBERRECHT UNO WJRTS• 
CHAFTSRECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FUR EUGEN ULMER ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG). I am indebted to 
Mr. Grayson McCouch, Fellow (1982-83), Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law, Munich, for providing the English translation. 
6. The three-groups system, adopted throughout UN organizations, divides the member-
states into the "B-Group" of western industrialized nations, the "D-Group" of socialist coun-
tries, and the "Group of77," comprising the developing nations. See notes 14-18 iefra and 
accompanying text. 
7. Part IV su=arizes discussions following a lecture entitled LPs Ires jimciones de/ control 
de la economia (derecho anli-monopolios), given by the author on April 6, 1983, at the 
Faculdad del Derecho de la Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona. The lecture will be pub-
lished in REVISTA DEL DERECHO MERCANTIL. The general contents of the discussions are 
reported here, and the author expresses his indebtedness to those who participated. 
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IL THE SEABED REGIME OF UNCLOS III AND THE THIRD WORLD 
SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX 
The following paragraphs contain some critical remarks concerning the 
Seabed Authority of UN CLOS III in particular, and the underlying policy 
issues in general. The overall picture shows that the three principal inter-
ested parties, the "Western" industrialized world (including Japan, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Israel, as well as Europe and North America), 
the developing countries, and the USSR-controlled socialist countries have 
different attitudes in viewing the law of the sea and what that law is about 
- the use of the sea. It would indeed be an "ethnocentric" mistake to 
assume that the two "other" groups look at the sea in the same way and 
with the same economic, navigation1 communication, research-related, and 
other interests as does the West when dealing with the law of the sea. 
For the West the sea is still a realm of freedom, a marketplace, a link 
between nations and continents, and therefore a platform on which one can 
trade, have dialogues, and meet someone. The sea has for democratic, in-
dustrialized nations the same function as a corridor in a condominium, 
where people move from one self-contained unit to another; the corridor 
consequently belongs to all and is, according to the rules of the house, free. 
This freedom is not chaos as is sometimes imputed in public discussion (the 
corridor has to be taken care of by common consent, it has to be kept clean, 
and so forth); it is ordered freedom. 
For developing countries, this kind of freedom is, if one may generalize, 
a foreign idea. The prevailing ways of thinking in developing countries 
(their "cultural personality" or "modes of thought," to borrow terms from 
anthropology) are not akin to the Western concepts of personal identity, of 
rights at the disposition of the individual. Therefore, the conception of the 
linkages between these individuals in terms of ordered freedom, ordered 
under a system of law and good faith, is also alien to them. Their general 
pattern of ordering is primarily vertical or horizontal rather than 
structured. 8 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1646) defined this "Western" interplay between in-
dividuality and liberty under the legal rule of good faith, and then trans-
posed his discovery to the community of nations: Nations are sovereign 
(analogous to the individuality of the human being), and between the sover-
eign nations there is the free space of liberty ordered by law and good 
faith.9 From this he deduced that the sea is free, providing thereby the 
basis for the general attitude of the West: All that does not belong to an 
individual or a sovereign state belongs to all, under a system of freedom 
8. See, e.g., C. NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY 12, 40-63 and passim (1970); see also w. 
F!KENTSCHER, assisted by H. KUNZ-HALLSTEIN, C. KLEINER, F. PENTZLIN & w. STRAUB, 
THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: A 
STUDY IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 27-39 (IIC Studies, Vol. 4, 1980), and references 
therein. Of course, these and the following (seemingly) sweeping and simplistic statements 
require a more detailed discussion than can be taken up here. 
9. See W. F!KENTSCHER, BL0CKE UND MONOPOLE IN DER WELTPOLITIK: DIE HERAUS-
FORDERUNG DER FRE!EN NATIONEN ch.2 (1979); W. FIKENTSCHER, DE FIDE ET PERFIDIA: 
DER TREUEGEDANKE IN DEN STAATSPARALLELEN DES HUGO GROTIUS AUS HEUTIGER S!CHT 
(Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische 
Klasse, No. 1, 1979). 
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and equal participation governed by good faith and international law. 
"Western" or "capitalist" international law applied this to other realms 
such as the air and outer space. 
During the decolonization period, the developing nations argued on the 
basis of this theory of freedom - they used it and became sovereign in the 
Western sense, that of Grotius. However, they did not accept the legal phi-
losophy of the West, the free linkages, the market, individual rights. Their 
own cultural traditions led them to look for another theory of what to do 
with items that belong neither to single beings nor to sovereign states. The 
result, which for them is quite logical and consistent, was a philosophy of 
the common heritage of mankind as an item of proprietary nature, and a 
fundamental rejection of the liberty of the sea (and of news communica-
tion). Without this liberty, the organizational result had to be the Seabed 
Authority as presented by UNCLOS III; a corresponding result is the diri-
giste application of the rules of distribution. 
Having become sovereign, the Third World challenges the foundations 
of sovereignty. This is the Third World sovereignty paradox that must be 
faced. If the West does not want to forgo the notions of personal and na-
tional sovereignty and the system of free linkages which is a corollary to 
both of them, it cannot accept the Seabed Authority envisioned by 
UNCLOS III. 
Finally, the viewpoint of the USSR, the leading country among the so-
cialist nations, is quite different from both the Third World and the West-
ern views. The Soviet navy has a purpose different from those of the U.S. 
and NATO navies. Its purpose follows from article 31 of the Soviet Consti-
tution of 1977, which requires the Red Army to fight for "socialist gains, the 
peaceful labour of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the State."10 When read together with articles 28 through 30, 
covering foreign policy, article 31 suggests that for the USSR the sea is a 
military-strategic object more than anything else. 
Given the disparity of views among Western, Third World, and socialist 
countries on how the sea should be used, what consequences follow from 
acknowledging these differences and taking a "nonethnocentric approach" 
to UNCLOS III? 
First, it must be recognized that the Seabed Authority would mean a 
breakthrough to a nonfreedom, nonmarket, nondialogue philosophy and 
should in its present form be rejected. Therefore, the aim of renegotiations 
- if there are any - ought to be to remove from the text all supranational 
constitutional elements, as long as the principal UN voting system remains 
in accord with the Grotius system of "one country/one vote" (which causes 
the procedural practice within the UN General Assembly to tend toward 
the so-called "consensus resolution"). An alternative organizational pattern 
could possibly be modeled on the machinery of the UN's Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices (RBP) Code. 11 There can be no doubt that the establishment 
10. KONSTITUTSIYA (Constitution of 1977) art. 31 (USSR), reprinted in A. UNGER, CON· 
STITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 239 {1981). 
11. See The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for /he Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RPB/CONF/10, reprinted in 19 INTL, LEGAL 
MATERIALS 813 (1980); Atkeson & Gill, The UNCTA.D Restrictive Business Practices Code: A 
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of the Seabed Authority regime goes beyond the framework of a regular 
treaty in international law, raising issues of a supranational and, therefore, 
constitutional (as opposed to contractual) character. That is why, with re-
spect to the Seabed Authority, UN CLOS III is not a draft treaty but a draft 
constitution of international law, raising questions of representation and 
democratic legitimation of formidable dimensions. 
Second, experience with other UN codes shows that the classical "Hugo 
Grotius approach" to international law, still the guiding principle within 
the group of Western industrialized countries, remains the backbone of in-
ternational relations in general. It is little wonder, because historically the 
"Hugo Grotius approach" of individual personality and liberty caused the 
West to become "industrialized." From this, a rule of thumb in UN affairs 
may be suggested: Never do anything important within the UN for which 
no parallel device exists within the framework of those twenty to thirty 
western states that created the concepts of liberty and sovereignty, whether 
that parallel device be found in Group B, the OECD,12 NATO, Free Na-
tions - whatever term or organizational context may seem appropriate. 
The RBP Code was adopted because the EEC and OECD provided "sam-
ples nearest in shade." International law today has, in this sense, an "in-
side" and an "outside." If the inside fails, the outside will not work 
because, in spite of the UN, there is no agreement on what this "outside 
international law" is good for: free linkages or nonstructured ordering. 
The reason for this development is the multiplicity of "cultural personali-
ties" or "modes of thought in law" - a multiplicity that has received gen-
eral acceptance within the UN while the Grotius system of sovereignty is 
still in general use. UNCLOS III is just one example. If, as many think, 
seabed mining in the area covered by UNCLOS III will remain a marginal 
industry for the foreseeable future, the trade-off of giving up the legal phi-
losophy which underlies sovereignty and international exchange on the ba-
sis of free trade and good faith simply seems too disadvantageous. 
Finally, because renegotiations with the target of reducing the Seabed 
Authority at least to the size of the usual "machinery" of a UN code of 
conduct - namely, an intergovernmental group of experts outside of the 
voting system of the UN (as in the RBP Code)- have failed, it is better not 
to adopt the UNCLOS treaty but rather to rely on the "inside" approach 
outlined above, or on any similar regional concept of "mini-treaties" or 
"Reciprocating States Agreements" (so-called "RSA's").13 Extraterritorial 
antitrust may serve as an already existing example. 
Step in the North-South Dialogue, 15 INTL. LAWYER 1 (1981); Oesterle, United Nations Coefer-
ence on Restrictive Business Practices, 14 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 1 (1981). 
12. Including the EEC and, therefore, Lome. 
13. See Seeberg-Elverfeldt, Isl ein zweispuriges System des Meeresherghaus praktisch mog-
lich?, in Symposium der IJeutsch-Amerikanischen Juristenvereinigung im Max-Planck-Inslitut 
for ausliindisches und inlernationales Privatrechl in Hamburg am 11.8.83: Ein Bericht, DAJV-
NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1983, at 3, 45. 
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Ill. DEVELOPMENT AID OR EXPANSION CONTROL - SOME POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A. Antitrust Law or Law of Technology Transfer? 
The western industrialized nations, a group that includes Japan, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand because of their market-economy orientation, are 
classified as "Group B" or "B-Group" countries in the UN and its subsid-
iary organizations. All of the larger countries in the B-Group have a na-
tional antitrust law of some sort (such as cartel laws, laws governing 
restraints on competition, or anti-monopoly laws). 14 Among the socialist 
countries, grouped together in the "D-Group and Mongolia," Yugoslavia 
has introduced a cartel law in combination with the decentralization of en-
terprise management. 15 Initiatives are also being taken in Hungary16 and 
Poland in planning laws against cartels. Otherwise, antitrust-type provi-
sions in the eighteen socialist countries, to the extent they exist at all, are 
confined to the constitutional ones directed exclusively against "monopoly 
capitalism" of a Western stamp.17 Of the developing countries that com-
prise the "Group of 77" (which today includes 125 countries), 18 a few have 
14. This holds true for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America (total number: 24). At the regional level, 
some of these countries are united by the cartel law of the EEC and the ECSC, and virtually 
all of them, including the smaller B-Group countries (such as Andorra, Monaco, Liechten-
stein, and so on), are united by the OECD rules of mutual assistance in antitrust affairs. See 
Davidow, Some Reflections on the OEC.D Competition Guidelines, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 441 
(1977); von Portatius, Wellbewerbspolitik in internationalen Organisationen, 29 WuW 229, 231 
(1979); Report by the Commillee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practlces on l'!formatio11 
Agreements, l3 ANTITRUST BULL. 225 (1968). 
15. See K. KNAP, PRAVO HOSPODARSKE S0UTEZE (1973); J. STRAUS, DAS WETIBE-
WERBSRECHT IN JUG0SLAWIEN (Schriftenreihe zum Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, Bd. 19, 1970); 
TRIFKOVIC, PRAV0 K0NKURENCUE (1981) (concerning competition law, and including a Ger-
man summary); Pretnar, .Das Wellbewerbsrecht in der 11eue11 Marklord11u11g Jugos/awiens, 1963 
GRUR INT. 536; Pretnar, .Das Recht der wirtschafllichen Zusammenschl/Jsse in Jugos/awie11, 
1959 GRUR INT. 590. 
16. See VOROS, DAS RECHT DES S0ZIALISTISCHEN MARKTVERHALTENS (1981); Vida,Neue 
wellbewerbsrechtliche Bestimmunge11 in lJ11garn, 1914 GRUR INT. 314. 
17. These countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the German Demo-
cratic Republic, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. 
18. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, the Comoro 
Islands, the Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Gre-
nada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Korea (People's Republic), Korea 
(Republic), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
the Maldive Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Ne-
pal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Pan-
ama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Rumania, Rwanda, the 
Solomon Islands, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles Islands, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadine Islands, 
Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Viet-
April/May 1984) Third World Trade Partnerships 1495 
cartel laws, 19 though the practical effectiveness of these laws may be ques-
tioned.20 Of increasing importance for developing countries are the na-
tional and regional legal provisions that regulate the transfer of technology 
from industrialized to developing countries.21 These controls are not con-
cerned merely with classical problems of competition law, such as restric-
tive clauses in licensing agreements, discrimination, and patent pools; they 
also relate to the promotion of general economic and social policy, and in-
frastructural goals such as the encouragement of investment, budget bal-
ancing, and use of local technology, raw materials, and labor. If such 
provisions are not complied within a particular technology-transfer agree-
ment, the national authority may refuse to authorize the agreement. The 
question has been raised whether this law of technology transfer involves 
something other than the conventional antitrust approach of industrialized 
countries, namely, cartel law. A second critical school asks whether the law 
of technology transfer is a counterdevelopment in response to western anti-
trust. A third school, contrasting with the first two, perceives in the technol-
ogy-transfer laws of developing countries normative attempts to take up the 
familiar themes of anti-monopoly law from the perspective of developing 
countries in order to meet these countries' own specific legal policy needs, 
yet also in acknowledgment of classical antitrust goals.22 It may be said in 
support of the first two viewpoints that the modem law of technology trans-
fer produces legal effects that previously were not to be found in cartel law, 
for example, the obligation to guarantee the suitability of the technology 
being transferred, preferential use of local personnel and materials, and 
regulation of corporate participation. The third theory is supported by the 
nam (1964: Republic of Vietnam), Yemen (Arab Republic), Yemen (Democratic), Yugoslavia 
(which also figures in the D-Group), Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. List complete as of Dec. 
1, 1981. See Sauvant, Die "Gruppe der 77"- Gewerkschqft der Dritten Welt, 29 VEREINTE 
NATIONEN 189 (1981). The People's Republic of China does not classify itself among any of 
the three Groups, B, D, or "77." The Republic of China (faiwan), as a nonmember of the 
UN, belongs to none of the groups, but pursues a market-economy course similar to the Japa-
nese model, and is preparing a "market law" which will contain cartel law provisions. See Su 
YEONG-CHIN, M0GLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN GESETZGEBERJSCHER MASSNAHMEN ZU 
PROBLEMEN DER MARKTWIRTSCHAFT IN NATIONALCHINA (fAIWAN) (dissertation, University 
of Munich, 1981). 
19. Specifically, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philip-
pines, and Venezuela. 
20. See G. CABANELLAS, ANTITRUST AND DIRECT REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS n.3 (IIC Studies, Vol. 7) 47-50 (1984); Cabanellas 
& Etzrodt, Das neue argentinische Kartellrecht vom 1.8.1980, 27 RIW / AWD 155 (1981); Cira, 
Observations on Current Developments in Restrictive Business Practice Control Legislation in 
Latin America, R. SUISSE DR. INT. CoNC., Oct. 1982, at 29, 41 (perceives Argentina as the 
only country with a cartel law "free from interventionist baggage"); Correa, La Regulaciim de 
las clausulas Restrictiva en los Contratos de Transferencia de Techologia en el Derecho Latino-
americano, 14 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL y DE LAS OBLIGAC!ONES 183 (1981). 
21. The countries in which technology-transfer statutes have been enacted include Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, India, Korea (Republic), Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, 
Venezuela, and Zambia, as well as the Andean Pact at the regional level; see the synoptic 
evaluation of these provisions in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Control of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, U.N. Doc. 
TD/B/C.6/72 (1982). 
22. For details of this position, as distinguished from the others, see G. CABANELLAS,supra 
note 20, at 50. 
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fact that most technology-transfer laws - even those pursuing the particu-
lar economic policy of developing countries - greatly resemble their coun-
terparts in Western antitrust law in provisions that concern contract clauses 
restricting competition through licensing or similar agreements. Some of 
the Western models reflected in such technology-transfer laws are the 
"Nine No-No's" of U.S. antitrust law,23 sections 20 and 21 of the German 
Law Against Restraints on Competition,24 and the proposed block exemp-
tion regulation for patent licensing agreements under articles 85 and 87 of 
the EEC Treaty.25 The degree of similarity varies as to the type, content, 
scope, and goal of the particular clauses.26 
If the rapidly evolving technology-transfer law of developing countries 
is essentially different from the law of restraints on competition, then cau-
tion must be exercised in applying basic concepts and principles from cartel 
law in the context of technology-transfer law. This would be true, for ex-
ample, with respect to the two principles of prohibition and abuse control; 
or the "rule of reason" doctrine;27 the basically anti-interventionist stance 
of the law of restraints on competition; the cooperation of cartel authorities 
from industrialized countries with technological authorities from Third 
World countries; the understanding of the relationship between the law of 
industrial property and copyright, and that of cartels or technology transfer; 
the planning of appropriate international conventions and executive agree-
ments; the development of model laws by international expert groups 
("machineries"), as provided for in the guidelines of the RBP Code; and, 
not least of all, the furnishing of technical assistance to antitrust and tech-
nological authorities in developing countries from cartel authorities in in-
dustrialized countries.28 The problems concerning the nature of 
technology-transfer law thus have great practical, as well as methodologi-
cal, significance. 
The solutions to these problems are made easier if the local policy un-
derlying the cartel laws of the market-economy industrialized countries is 
taken into account. When it was enacted, this policy was based on consid-
erations of economic fairness, competitive efficiency, and democratic values 
generally, and consisted of controlling and dispersing private economic 
power which had arisen and which posed a threat exclusively, or at least 
23. See Griffin, 77re .Demise of the "Nine No-No's" and Other Significant Changes in U.S. 
Antitrust Policy Conceming Transnational Technology Licensing, R. SUISSE DR. INT. CoNc., 
June 1982, at 39. 
24. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrllnkungen (of 1957) §§ 20, 21, 1980 BGBl I 1761, 1766 
(W. Ger.). 
25. See Proposal for a Commission Regulation on the application of article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 
(Mar. 3, 1979); 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 110) 10 (May 3, 1979). Both of these are reprinted 
in 1979 GRUR INT. 208. 
26. See G. CABANELLAS, supra note 20; Correa, supra note 20. 
27. See, e.g., Wiszniewska, Book Review, PANSTWO I PRAWO, Dec. 1982, at 135, 137 (re-
viewing W. FJKENTSCHER, supra note 8). 
28. Technical assistance within the framework of the RBP Code is urged in Greenhill, 
Principles and Rules on Restrictive Business Practices, CTC REPORTER, Summer 1982, at 30. 
The similarity between the two legal fields is there set out from the perspective of an experi-
enced practitioner. 
April/May 1984] Third World Trade Partnerships 1497 
predominantly, within each individual country.29 Developing countries, by 
contrast, are not typically confronted with the problem of internal private 
economic power. The economic power that is perceived as a basis for de-
velopment aid, yet also as a potential threat in the developing countries, 
stems primarily from foreign sources. Thus, in many cases developing 
countries must resort to importing technology from precisely the foreign 
corporations whose economic behavior should be subject to a national legal 
control. This basic outward orientation of legal policy with respect to eco-
nomic power gives the law of technology transfer its own special character. 
Aside from this outward orientation, however, the essential basis for the 
concern of legal policy with economic power is the same in developing 
countries as in Western industrialized countries. The policy of the law-
maker is determined by a combination of goals: economic fairness, bal-
anced competition and social-welfare considerations, efficiency within the 
context of the particular policy goals set by the state, and, not least of all, 
security in the face of political pressure from private enterprises, including 
foreign suppliers of technology. 
If the purely national significance of the typical technology-transfer law 
in developing countries is compared with that of the typical antitrust law in 
market-economy industrialized countries, an impression of two distinct 
fields of law emerges, barely bordering on one another yet having a few 
peripheral points in common; the question whether the law of antitrust and 
that of technology transfer actually constitute one integral legal field would 
have to be answered in the negative. However, if the political and historical 
situation in which antitrust and technology-transfer law came into existence 
is taken into account, then the legal policy goals largely coincide, and the 
idea of an essentially integral legal field, along with that of the transferability 
of basic concepts and legal principles from one context to the other, be-
comes fully plausible. 
It should be noted here that mere national antitrust can hardly serve as 
a counterpart for comparison with technology-transfer law. A purely na-
tional view of antitrust law has long since ceased to correspond to the real-
ity of world economics, and hardly continues to correspond to legal reality. 
Today, many Western industrialized countries rely on exports for more 
than fifty percent of their national income. The interweaving of interna-
tional economics has' progressed far beyond national antitrust, which has 
attempted to keep up by developing "extraterritorial" coverage.30 If the 
cartel laws of the West are viewed in their entirety, complete with the doc-
trine of "extraterritoriality" already at hand, as elements and building 
blocks of a law for controlling economic behavior - partly in existence 
29. For particulars concerning these goals of antitrust, see Fikentscher, Methodos - axio-
logisi - oikonomia (Method- Values-Economy), 1977 To SYNTAGMA 495 (with summary 
in French); Fikentscher, Iktisadi kontrolfln ilqfonksiyona tekelleri bnleme hukuku (The Three 
Functions of Economic Control Law), 10 BANKA VE TICARET HUKUKU DERGISI 711 (1980). 
30. Rather than a complete list of the many discussions of this topic, a few representative 
sources will do. See, e.g., R. BAR, KARTELLRECHT UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 366 
(Abhandlung zum schweizerischen Recht, Bd. 369, 1965); Ongman, "Be No Langer a Chaos'!· 
Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 
Nw. u. L. REV. 733 (1977); Rehbinder, in u. IMMENGA & E. MESTMACKER, GWB KoM-
MENTAR ZUM KARTELLGESETZ § 98, ~ 2, nn. 7 et seq. (1981). 
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already and partly in the making - then the developing countries' laws of 
technology transfer also fit into this economic control law as an essential 
component. The legislative goals, as well as the factual situation to be regu-
lated, are in harmony. International economic development leads not only 
to the internationalization of classical antitrust law, but also to the creation 
of a regional and transnational law of economic control. This law of eco-
nomic control includes elements of technology-transfer law, as well as the 
doctrine of impermissible "monopolizing" in the sense of U.S. antitrust law, 
the French tradition of prohibiting "refus de vente," the Swiss derivation of 
antitrust from the prohibition of boycotting and the right of freedom of 
personality, and the German experience with the paradox of freedom that 
breaks apart if allowed to develop completely without restrictions. 
The pursuit of this integrative model of antitrust goals may cause some 
proponents of conventional national antitrust to reconsider the legal policy 
they endorse. For example, the currently influential "Chicago School" of 
economics postulates efficiency as the only antitrust value worth pursuing.31 
Yet a glance at the law of technology transfer in the context of global eco-
nomic control is sufficient to indicate a multiplicity of values extending far 
beyond economic efficiency and embracing considerations of state .financ-
ing, social policy, infrastructure, environmental protection, and cultural 
policy. "Chicago-style" single-value antitrust can still be pursued at the 
national level, of course, but, if one does not shut one's eyes to reality, the 
heyday of national antitrust is clearly over. 
B. Consequences for the Application of Cartel Law and for a New 
Orientation in .Development Aid 
1. Content, Interpretation, and Application of National and Regional 
Cartel Laws and of the RBP Code 
A transnational perspective on anti-monopoly law that takes the goals 
of technology-transfer law into account clearly must exercise a decided in-
fluence on the interpretation of cartel law and rules at the national, regional 
(such as the EEC, ECSC, and Andean Pact), and international (such as the 
RBP Code) levels. 
This is true first of all at the international level, where, for example, it 
could be concluded that the treatment of international transactions in a 
manner essentially favorable to cartels should be discontinued, and provi-
sions that allow this should not be adopted in the future. The frequently 
encountered preferential treatment of import and export cartels would thus 
have to be abandoned.32 In the context of cooperation between national 
31. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Reder, Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, 20 J, 
EcoN. LIT. I (1982). For the opposing view ("multi-value antitrust"), see Sullivan, Antitntst, 
Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV, I 
(1980), and sources cited therein. 
32. See Allison,Antitrttst and Foreign Trade: Exemption for Export Associations, 11 Hous. 
L. REv. 1124 (1974) (discussing the United States' Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act); Arm-
strong, American Import Controls and Morality in International Trade: An Analysis of Section 
307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 8 N.Y.U. J. lNTL. L. & POL. 19 (1975) (discussing potential use of 
§ 307 ban on imports to coerce "immoral" governments); Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: 
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cartel authorities (in some cases pursuant to international treaty),33 it must 
then be noted that while the cartel ministries of the Western industrialized 
countries are concerned primarily with economic concentration within their 
own countries, the technological authorities of the developing countries by 
contrast are concerned primarily with economic concentration on the part 
of others. At the regional level as well, above all in the context of the Euro-
pean Communities and the Andean Pact, there must be a corresponding 
readiness to acknowledge the to-some-extent-contrasting legal policy values 
of the other side. 
Not least of all, under a multi-value antitrust perspective, the RBP Code 
must not be interpreted and applied exclusively according to classical West-
em antitrust principles; it must likewise take into account the specific and 
aggregate policy goals of those countries whose control regulations are di-
rected primarily against foreign rather than domestic economic power. 
Conversely, the integrative approach of the RBP Code makes it possible to 
introduce traditional principles of Western antitrust - for example, the 
rule of reason, the principle of comparable markets, the legal operation of 
anti-discrimination provisions, intra-enterprise competition concepts, the 
recognition of ancillary restraints on competition, and the experience in ap-
plying cartel provisions as protective laws.34 These considerations are just 
as important for the activities of the International Expert Group ("machin-
ery") under the RBP Code as for the related work on revision of the Code. 
2. Modern Criticisms of Development Aid 
The conception of transnational economic control as a multi-value regu-
latory instrument also opens up new prospects for national and interna-
tional measures that have been summarized under the rubric of 
"development aid." The criticisms of development aid, both in conven-
Musi Competition Stop at the Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 399 (1973) (alterna-
tives to Webb-Pomerene Act's exemption of export trade from U.S. antitrust laws); de Keyser, 
Territorial Restrictions and Export Prohibitions under the United Stales and the Common Mar-
ket Antitrnsl Laws, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271 (1964); Markert, Zur gegenwiirtigen Situation 
der Exportkartelle, 16 AWD 99, 105 (1970) (discussing the Webb-Pomerene Act); Rehbinder, 
supra note 30, at § 6, nn. 9-29 (with a report on the sharpening of German controls on export 
cartels); id. at § 7, nn. 4-6 (same as to import cartels). In Germany, the fourth cartel law 
amendment in 1980 introduced broadened control over abuse of basically favored export car-
tels, by changing§ 12, ~ 2, cl. 1, and§ 44, ~ 1, cl. 2, of the Law Against Restraints on Competi-
tion. SeeGesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen, 1980 BGBl I 1761, 1765, 1777 (Y'I. Ger.). 
The grant of power to the Federal Minister of the Economy rather than the Federal Cartel 
Office reflects the special consideration of extra-economic interests. 
33. See, e.g., Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 
23, 1976, United States - Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, 
1976 BGBI II 1711 (Y'I. Ger.). The German Federal Cartel Office is authorized to initiate 
direct contacts in matters of mutual administrative assistance. See Richtlinien filr den Am-
tlichen Verkehr in das Ausland und mil ausllindischen Dienststellen im Inland, Special Regu-
lation No. 21, between the Office of External Affairs and the Federal Minister of the Economy, 
Mitteilungsblatt des Auswlirtigen Amtes, No. 3, Apr. 30, 1965. 
34. For details of the RBP Code, see Fikentscher & Straub, IJer RBP-Kodex der Vereinten 
Nationen: Weltkartellrichtlinien (pts. I & II), 1982 GRUR INT. 637, 727 (and sources cited 
therein); Fikentscher, supra note 2; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, Consideration of the Revised Draft of a Model Law or Laws on Restrictive Business 
Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/RBP/15 (1983). 
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tional forms and in general, are many and weighty. Why the sometimes 
extraordinary efforts to help developing countries have by and large had so 
little success - indeed, according to some commentators have caused more 
harm than good - is a much discussed theme that can only be touched 
upon here.35 Among the possible explanations is the exclusively horizontal 
or vertical (and therefore nonstructured) social ordering of most developing 
countries,36 manifested among other things in the lack of an economically 
substantial middle class, the strong trend toward centralized planning, and 
relatively "fragmented" social relationships; but perhaps these are only the 
symptoms of causes which as yet remain unknown. It is widely conceded 
that the so-called "trickle down" effect has not taken place - thus, the hope 
that aid directed at the head of state or leading groups in developing coun-
tries would more or less necessarily "seep through" to benefit the needy 
sections of the population has not been fulfi.lled.37 New approaches, for 
instance "decentralization" programs, are being tried, but their success is 
still the subject of investigation.38 
The international interest in indigenous economic structures and socio-
political factors has increased. But this knowledge may come too late for 
many areas that have been "opened up" through development aid. The 
currently prevalent opinion is that in many cases it may be preferable to 
refrain from giving aid altogether rather than to give it in the wrong way. 
3. Antitrust and .Development Aid 
Multi-value extraterritorial control of economic power could offer a new 
point of departure toward a solution. Technology-transfer law is one of the 
35. For detailed argument on this point, see, e.g., P. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD 
WORLD AND ECONOMIC DELUSION (1981); W. F!KENTSCHER, supra note 8, at 141-49; 
Bendokat, Entwicklungshi!fe - verschleudertes Kapital?, DER BORGER IM STAAT, Mar. 1970; 
Dahrendorf, Interview, EUROPA NEWSPAPER, No. 4, 1981, at 4; Fischer, Stills/and im Nord-
Slid-.Dialog: Chancen einer Neubesinnung, 35 EA 369 (1980); Hamburger, Es isl al/es ganz an-
ders, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 6, 1962, Wirtschaftsteil, at 5 (one of the earliest 
warnings); Holthus, Erntichterung in der Entwicklungspolitik, WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST No. V, 
1981, at 212; Lowenthal, Von der Strukturkrise der Weltwirtschqfi zur internationalen Slruk-
turpolitik, 33 GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE MoNATSHEFTE 235 (1982). 
36. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
37. This illusion is emphasized in Dahrendorf, supra note 35 (citing Raul Prebisch, the 
General Director ofUNCTAD for many years, as the source of the concept of"trickle down"), 
38. See, e.g., DEPT. OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES, UNIV. OF PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA, DECENTRALIZATION: THE PAPUA NEW GUINEAN EXPERIMENT (1978); E. KosWARA, 
THE DECENTRALIZATION SYSTEM IN INDONESIA (1969); J. NYERERE, DECENTRALIZATION: 
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (1972); USAID, OFFICE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT, MANAG• 
ING DECENTRALIZATION: PROJECT PAPER (1979); R. YIN & D. YATES, STREET-LEVEL Gov-
ERNMENTS: ASSESSING DECENTRALIZATION AND URBAN SERVICES (1975); Andors, Hobbes & 
Weber vs. Marx & Mao: The Political Economy of .Decentralization in China, 6 BULL, CON• 
CERNED ASIAN SCHOL. Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 19; Appleby, Some 17toughts on .Decentralised .De-
mocracy, 8 INDIAN J. PUB. Ao. 443 (1962); Chauhan, .Democratic Decentralization and Local 
Administration in India, Nepal and Pakistan, 1977 ASIA Q. 279; Furniss, The Practical Sign!fi-
cance of .Decentralization, 36 J. PoL. 958 (1974); Rondinelli, National Investment Planning and 
Equity Policy in .Developing Countries: The Challenge of .Decentralized Administration, IO POL· 
ICY SCIENCES 45 (1978); Note, Conflict Resolution in a Politically .Decentralized Local Govern-
ment System, 11 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 629 (1975); P. Reis Vieira, Towards a Theory of 
Decentralization, A Comparative View of Forty-Five Countries (dissertation, Univ. of South-
ern California, Los Angeles, 1967). 
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most important instruments of legal policy and doctrine in the developing 
countries. Of course, "extraterritorial antitrust law" means more and func-
tions more broadly than "development aid," and conversely not all 
problems of development aid can be resolved through use of extraterritorial 
antitrust law. However, it may well be that a multi-value antitrust ap-
proach that incorporates the themes of technology transfer can give new 
impetus to development aid by replacing economic aid to developing coun-
tries with a control on economic expansion into those countries. 
If it is true that the "trickle down" effect takes place either not at all or 
on too small a scale, then the fault, with reference to the goals of technol-
ogy-transfer policy, must lie not only with Western donor firms that engage 
in particular practices but also with the elites, managers, and heads of state 
in the developing countries who cooperate with those firms. Conceptually, 
under this view, the conflict between North and South becomes one be-
tween rich and poor - a conflict, basically unrelated to national affiliations, 
between the powerful and the powerless. In place of development aid in 
the traditional sense, that is, as support above all for heads of state and 
other high-ranking entities in the developing countries, the policy emphasis 
comes to include control directed against the abuses of "Western" corpora-
tions and countries in their expansion into the Third World, which is itself 
frequently motivated by development-aid considerations. The issue is that 
the local elites in developing countries often take part in expansion from 
outside, yet the aid either fails to reach the places where it is most needed or 
does so under conditions that do not best suit the local economic and social 
order. 
The slogan "expansion control instead of development aid" would be 
too simplistic and easily misunderstood. If development aid is conceived of 
as an adjustment of economic imbalances between stronger and weaker 
countries that corrects the market and thereby creates markets - to express 
it in neo-liberal terms - then there is no alternative to development aid. 
On the other hand, it is precisely in this process that development aid be-
comes a field of endeavor for international economic control, which is the 
focus of attention here. 
4. Consequences for the Extraterritorial Application of National Cartel 
Law 
Due to legislative intent, the technology-transfer laws of the developing 
countries have had an extraterritorial orientation, at least in the past. By 
contrast, extraterritoriality presents a stumbling block for the application of 
the cartel laws of the industrialized West. The latter problem is constantly 
discussed, and the proposed solution generally consists of national caution 
and international comity.39 However, if the approach proposed here is fol-
39. The discussion on this subject is voluminous. See, e.g., F. HERMANNS, 
VOLKERRECHTLICHE GRENZEN FUR PIE ANWENDUNG KARTELLRECHTLICHER VER-
BOTSNORMEN (Forschungsinstitut far Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettbewerb - Schriften-
reihe, Heft 48, 1969); K. MEESSEN, VOLKERRECHTLICHE GRUNDSATZE DES INTERNATIONALEN 
KARTELLRECHTS {VOlkerrecht und lnternationales Wirtschaftsrecht, Bd. 5, 1975); Rehbinder, 
supra note 30, at§ 98, ~ 2, nn. 17-54 (citing further sources); Mann, Limitations on the Exercise 
of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction with Particular Reference to Anti-Trust Legislation, 1958 REPORT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFERENCE 87. From the case law see, Judgment of May 29, 
1502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1489 
lowed - that is, multi-value, transnational control on economic power 
incorporating the goals of the developing countries' technology-transfer 
laws - then the extraterritorial effect of national antitrust must be affirmed 
outright, particularly in the area of development aid. This, of course, re-
quires that countries with cartel laws reach sufficient agreement among 
themselves so that they do not encroach on each other's rights in the extra-
territorial application of their national cartel laws. The same holds true 
with respect to the technology-transfer laws of the developing countries. 
Thus, a need exists for harmonizing the extraterritorial claims of national 
cartel laws, as well as for official cooperation among national cartel authori-
ties, technology-transfer authorities, and the International Expert Group 
under the RBP Code. This harmonization need not be universal; it may 
work better on a regional ( or even bilateral) scale, notwithstanding due re-
gard for RBP standards and terms. If this were successful, the "trickle 
down" effect - a clumsy term for what might better be called the "attain-
ment of development goals" - would no longer present a fundamental 
problem. With this normative harmonization and official cooperation, the 
issue would be one of economic and social molding in the developing coun-
tries through an extraterritorial cartel policy of the "B-Group" and "Group 
of 77" countries that was as unified as possible, with the goal of economic 
equity within the poorer economic areas as well as between the poorer and 
richer economic areas. 
C. Toward a Model for a Transnational Law of Economic Control 
I. Competition and Legitimate Competitive Advantages 
The word "Ordnungspolitik" (signifying legal-economic policy of a neo-
(Ordo-) liberal style, as developed by the Freiburg School of economists) is 
specifically German, but the problem that it describes is a general one, 
which has been raised most recently with the completion of the RBP 
Code.40 In formulating transnational economic controls, it must be decided 
whether to proceed according to the precepts of unrestrained liberalism, the 
neo-liberal rules of law for a market economy, a purely or primarily in-
terventionist system, the administration of a justum pretium (such as use 
value in Marxist value theory), a course of pragmatism in the sense of a 
mixed economy, "planification" in the French sense, or some other control 
model. This, in turn, determines the choice of an appropriate distribution, 
which is to serve as a guiding principle. To some extent, the international 
discussion of "Ordnungspolitik" has only just begun. Considering the 
predominantly market-economy character of the world economy at present, 
it would be natural to follow a liberal concept and continue to pursue the 
UN's policy up to now. It should be emphasized, however, that given the 
German experience, the model cannot be that of perfect, or even "voll-
1979, Bundesgerichtshof, Kartellsenat, W. Ger., 74 BGHZ 322, WuW /E BGH 1613 (29 WuW 
765) ("Organische Pigmente"); Judgment of July 12, 1973, Bundesgerichtshof, Kartellsenat, 
W. Ger., 25 BGHSt 208, WuW /E BGH 1276 (23 WuW 702) ("Olfeldrohre"); Judgment of 
Nov. 26, 1980, Ka=ergericht Berlin, 27 RJW/AWD 403, 407 (1981) ("Bayer-Firestone"); 
Judgment of July 1, 1983, Ka=ergericht Berlin, WuW /E OLG 3051 (34 WuW 233) ("Mor-
ris-Rothmans"). 
40. See note 34 supra. 
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stii.ndig" competition, which might conceivably describe the continuing in-
ternational cooperative efforts in the field of substantive cartel and 
technology-transfer law and the corresponding authorities.41 Rather, the 
model of competition must correspond to practical observation; and insofar 
as it is pragmatically conceived, it must include the concept of competitive 
advantages. Competition must occur with something and for something. It 
cannot be conducted without competitive advantages giving rise to mini-
monopolies. Perfect (atomistic) competition is no competition at all; "voll-
standig" (strategy-free) competition (where information is taken from the 
market; competitive pressure; Euckenian competition) is a special form that 
rarely occurs and cannot serve as a model. The function of law is to pre-
vent the legitimate competitive advantages that are necessary for practical 
competition from burgeoning into restraints which are harmful to 
competition. 
2. Industrial Property Rights and Copyright as Legitimate Competitive 
Advantages 
Among the legitimate competitive advantages that function to promote 
competition are contractual claims and intellectual property rights. The 
importance of intellectual property, in the form of patents, utility models, 
copyrights, designs, models, and the like, is particularly significant in the 
search for a model of world economic order. The prospects for the develop-
ment of economic progress with the goal of economic and social equity in 
the poorer countries are not improved by the diffident attitude of some de-
veloping countries toward intellectual property, the often inadequate pro-
tection afforded it in these countries, and their delayed support for legal 
protection of intellectual property under international conventions. With-
out such legal protection, the advantages that would foster competition and, 
in turn, a market - as the instrument that presumptively serves as the most 
socially equitable distribution mechanism for scarce goods - are lacking. 
This is demonstrated by the Japanese example.42 Equally unconvincing, 
however, is the attitude of some antitrust representatives in Western indus-
trialized countries, which underestimates the importance of industrial prop-
erty and copyright at the same time that it adopts, or intends to adopt, a 
particularly favorable stance toward competition. The noteworthy reserve 
with respect to patents and their economic application in the EEC Commis-
sion's proposed block-exemption regulation on patent licensing agreements 
should be mentioned here, as well as some criticisms leveled against sec-
tions 20 and 21 of the German Law Against Restraints on Competition.43 
41. For a discussion of these concepts, see, e.g., 2 W. FIKENTSCHER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 
§ 22, at III,~~ 3, 4 (1983) (containing.an overview of the literature); W. MoscHEL, RECHT DER 
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN 41-95 (1983); I. SCHMIDT, WETTBEWERBSTHEORIE UND 
POLITIK 7 (1981). 
42. See Rahn, Die Bedeutung des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes for die wirtschaflliche 
Entwicklung: Diejapanischen Erfahrungen, 1982 GRUR INT. 577 (and sources cited therein). 
43. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen, 1980 BGBI I 1761 (W. Ger.); Proposal for 
a Commission Regulation on the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of patent licensing agreements, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 (Mar. 3, 1979). For com-
mentary, see V. EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT 338 (3d ed. 1979); H. JOHANNES, INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (European Aspects, Law Series 
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There is a real and indisputable danger that restraints on competition may 
be established and defended with the use of exclusive industrial property 
rights, such as through cross-licensing or pools. However, it should not be 
overlooked that aside from such restraints on competition, industrial prop-
erty rights and copyrights are the most important factors next to tangible 
property and contract rights for making competition possible in the first 
place.44 Along with the essentially critical attitude of extreme advocates of 
competition toward patents, the opposition of some developing and socialist 
countries to industrial property rights in the form of subjective rights has 
created obstacles to reform of the Paris Convention.45 Fundamentally, an 
atomistic conception of competition is just as hostile to practical competi-
tion as the intended abolition of property in socialism and the deficient pro-
motion of property in developing countries with "nonstructured" social 
orderings. It will be difficult for a transnational antitrust approach taking 
technology-transfer goals into consideration, supported by the extraterrito-
rial application of national cartel laws, to prevail against the opposition of 
the developing countries, opponents of industrial property in the ranks of 
extreme competition theorists, and representatives of Marxist legal thought 
in the East and the West, especially since there are institutional opponents 
oflarge-scale "Western" industry and economy as well. These opponents of 
such a model form a motley front - yet, to the extent it holds together, a 
formidable one - against free competition and against the market as pre-
sumptively the most socially equitable distribution mechanism. 
D. Results 
Despite the opposition described above, undeniable progress toward a 
fairly constituted, functioning world market has been made, particularly 
through the UN's practice of setting down economic guidelines in the form 
of codes - a practice begun in 1974, when the "New International Eco-
No. 17, 1976); H. JOHANNES, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UNO URHEBERRECHT IM 
EUROP.AISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT (Recht der lnternationalen Wirtschaft -
Schriftenreihe, Heft 9, 1973); MoNOPOLKOMMISSION, FORTSCHREITENDE KONZENTRATION 
BEi GROSSUNTERNEHMEN 361-84 (Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission II, 1978); Em-
merich, JJie Auslegung von Art. 85 Abs. 1 EWG-Vertrag durch die bisherige Praxis der Ko111111is• 
sion, 6 EuR 295, 329-34 (1971); E=erich, in GWB KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLOESETZ, 
supra note 30, at § 20, nn. 48-59. 
44. On the legal policies behind industrial property law, see Beier, JJie Bedeutung des 
Paten/systems jlir den technischen, wirtschafllichen und sozialen Fortschritt, 1919 GRUR INT. 
227; Beier & Kunz, JJie Bedeutung des Patentrechts jlir den Transfer von Tee/mo/ogle In 
Entwicklungsliinder, 1972 GRUR INT. 385. 
45. International Convention for the Protection oflndustrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 
Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379, as amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 
6923. For an overview of the Paris Convention and a list of members of the Patent Union, see 
2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 132.4(2)-150 (rev. ed. 1984). 
On the problems encountered in amending the Paris Convention, see Kunz-Hallstein, JJle 
Ge'!fer Ko'!ferenz zur Revision der Pariser Verbands!Jbereinkueft zum Schutze des gewerbl/chen 
Eigentums, 1981 GRUR INT. 137. With respect to copyright law, the attitudes are obviously 
different, and certain developing countries are according increasing importance to the protec-
tion of intellectual creations and artistic achievements. See A. DIETZ, URHEBERRECHT UNO 
ENTWICKLUNOSLANDER (1981); Kunz-Hallstein, Recent Trends in Copyright Legislation of JJe-
veloping Countries, 13 IIC 689 (1982); JJeveloping-Count,;y Needs for Copyrighted Works, 15 
COPYRIGHT BULL. No. 2, 1981, at 10. 
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nomic Order" was drawn up as a program. The cartel guidelines of the 
RBP Code provide a worldwide formulation and normative anchoring for 
all UN member-states, with the goals of protecting consumers and avoiding 
discrimination and restraints on trade.46 The same zeal should be brought 
to further work on drafting rules for technology transfer (TOT Code), to 
develop standards with respect to the activities of multinational corpora-
tions and the protection of foreign investments (TNE Code), and to reform 
the International (Paris) Convention. In this respect it is worthwhile to 
make use of the experience of the national cartel authorities in the Western 
industrialized countries, as well as that of the technology-transfer authori-
ties of the Third World, not in the sense of a confrontation or juxtaposition, 
but rather as part of a system of world economic legal norms for the control 
of economic power and behavior. 
IV. REGIONAL (AND INTER-REGIONAL) HARMONIZATION AND 
COOPERATION IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
LEGAL NORMS FOR THE CONTROL OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES 
A. Concepts 
If one accepts that national extraterritorial legal and administrative con-
trol of "one's own" business and its expansion into world markets is the 
more practical and promising way to establish fair trade partnership with 
other countries, especially Third World nations, rather than reliance on su-
pranational control by authorities of UN origins, one important problem 
remains: Conflicting national extraterritorial laws may result in what might 
be called a catch-as-catch-can approach to transnational economic transac-
tions. The so-called "claw-back" statutes and mutual anti-dumping proce-
dures may be cited as examples of this kind of disintegration of 
international relations.47 Apart from these extreme cases of disorder -
which do exist - international cooperation seems to be the general rule.48 
Regional units like the EEC provide rules for the harmonization of laws 
having effect outside the national territory.49 Eric Stein, to whom this pa-
per is dedicated with affection and respect for his many contributions to a 
better understanding of the European process of legal and economic 
integration, has devoted some of his studies to the phenomenon of regional 
harmonization.50 To the same end, sections E and F of the RBP 
46. See note 34 supra. 
47. On the related problem of compulsory discovery of documents located in foreign coun-
tries, see, e.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 
see also 2 w. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 41, § 27, at II; PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffen ed. 1979). 
48. An example is the Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices 
entered into by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. See note 33 supra. 
49. See 1 W. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 41, § 13, at V, ~ 2.3; Schwartz, Wege zur EG-
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST VON CAEMMERER 1067 (1978); Seidel, 
Ziele und Ausmass der Rechtsangleichung in der EWG: Zur hritischen A1!ffassung, 14 EuR 171 
(1979). 
50. See, e.g., E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: NATIONAL RE-
FORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION (1971); Stein, Harmonization of European Com-
1506 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1489 
Code51 call for a harmonization of national antitrust activities and rules 
having international effect. Section E reads: 
Principles and rules far States at national, regional and subregional levels 
I. States should, at the national level or through regional groupings, 
adopt, improve and effectively enforce appropriate legislation and imple-
menting judicial and administrative procedures for the control of restric-
tive business practices, including those of transnational corporations. 
2. States should base their legislation primarily on the principle of 
eliminating or effectively dealing with acts or behaviour of enterprises 
which, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position 
of market power, limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain com-
petition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on their trade or 
economic development, or which through formal, informal, written or un-
written agreements or arrangements among enterprises have the same 
impact. 
3. States in their control of restrictive business practices should ensure 
treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable, on the same basis to all 
enterprises, and in accordance with established procedures of law. The 
laws and regulations should be publicly and readily available. 
4. States should seek appropriate remedial or preventive measures to 
prevent and/or control the use of restrictive business practices within their 
competence when it comes to the attention of States that such practices 
adversely affect international trade and particularly the trade and develop-
ment of the developing countries. 
5. Where, for the purposes of the control of restrictive business prac-
tices, a State obtains information from enterprises containing legitimate 
business secrets, it should accord such information reasonable safeguards 
normally applicable in this field, particularly to protect its confidentiality. 
6. States should institute or improve procedures for obtaining infor-
mation from enterprises, including transnational corporations, necessary 
for their effective control of restrictive business practices, including in this 
respect details of restrictive agreements, understandings and other 
arrangements. 
7. States should establish appropriate mechanisms at the regional and 
sub-regional levels to promote exchange of information on restrictive busi-
ness practices and on the application of national laws and policies in this 
area, and to assist each other to their mutual advantage regarding control 
of restrictive business practices at the regional and sub-regional levels. 
8. States with greater expertise in the operation of systems for the con-
trol of restrictive business practices should, on request, share their experi-
ence with, or otherwise provide technical assistance to, other States wishing 
to develop or improve such systems. 
9. States should, on request, or at their own initiative when the need 
comes to their attention, supply to other States, particularly of developing 
pany Laws, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 318 (1972); Stein,Assimi/ation of National Laws as a 
Function of European Integration, 58 AM. J. INTL. L. 1 (1964); Stein, Harmonization of Law in 
the European Economic Community, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ANTI-TRUST LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 27 
(Intl. & Comp. L.Q. Supp. Pub. No. 6, 1963). 
51. U.N. Doc. TD/RPB/CONF/10, reprinted in 19 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 813, 819-20 
(1980); see also note 34 supra. 
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countries, publicly available information, and, to the extent consistent with 
their laws and established public policy, other information necessary to the 
receiving interested States for its effective control of restrictive business 
practices. 
Section F reads in part: 
International measures 
Collaboration at the international level should aim at eliminating or 
effectively dealing with restrictive business practices, including those of 
transnational corporations, through strengthening and improving controls 
over restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, 
particularly that of developing countries, and the economic development 
of these countries. 
Although in the front line of devices designed to work as instruments of 
worldwide (or UN-wide) harmonization and coordination, sections E and F 
do not exclude but rather encourage regional and interregional initiatives. 
In other fields as well, UN agencies have advised interregional planning of 
rules for national public control of business behavior having effects outside 
the national territory.52 
International cooperation and adjustment of national rules and admin-
istrative activities for exercising public control over economic behavior with 
extraterritorial repercussions thus need not be conceived of as worldwide or 
UN-wide. Such rules and administrative actions may be more effective the 
less they attempt to be so. In the vast majority oflegal-economic issues, the 
"competent unit" is smaller than the world economy in general. Regional 
and interregional harmonization of laws, administrative cooperation, infor-
mation, and exchange may therefore show better results than UN-spon-
sored programs, some of which have encountered growing criticism for 
their clumsiness and over-organization.53 Problems caused by the existence 
of the division into Groups B, D, and "77" - useful for the decisionmaking 
process in UN bodies but cumbersome and ill-equipped to tackle issues that 
ask for quick and unideological solutions - could be avoided or at least 
diminished. To be sure, the framework of the UN should not be weakened 
by an overemphasis on regional agreements.54 UN and regional ap-
proaches should be combined in a useful cooperation of regulatory systems 
of international law. Again, Eric Stein has shown in many of his articles 
how a region, Europe, can successfully develop its intraregional order in 
accordance with general international law and the UN organization.55 The 
52. See, e.g., Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N. Economic and Social 
Council, Comm. on Natural Resources (8th Session), U.N. Doc. E/C.7/1983/5 {Apr. 7, 1983) 
(paper discussing ways to overcome the accelerated decline in mineral investment in develop-
ing countries). 
53. See sources cited in notes 3, 13, 35 supra. 
54. See Perez de Cuellar, Multilalerale Zusammenarbeit in Gefahr: Bericht des General-
sekretlirs fiber die Arbeil der Organisation an die 38. Generalversammlung, 31 VEREINTE NA-
TJONEN 155 (1983). 
55. See Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 15 AM. J. 
INTL. L. I (1981) (stressing the role of the judiciary in shaping regional law); Stein, Conjlict-of-
Laws Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional Market, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1327 
(1970); Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the European Eco-
nomic Community, 48 Riv. DIR. INTERN. I (1965); Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Consti-
tution by Judicial Fial: On the Margin of the Costa Case, 63 MICH. L. REv. 491 (1965); see also 
1508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1489 
trend in the international law of the sea is the regional or multilaterally 
functioning "mini-treaty" within a UN-regional double system.56 
B. Examples 
A "harmonized" regionalism would pursue harmonization on a bilat-
eral, trilateral, or regional basis, paying due attention to (but not necessarily 
being bound by) UN programs and guidelines. It would work functionally 
rather than geographically and thus - in case of demand -
interregionally. 
A region where this approach - regional coordination and harmoniza-
tion of national legal and administrative activities for the public control of 
economic behavior having extraterritorial effect - could be put to a test 
consists of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. This part of the 
world has always been a distinct "economic region" ("Wirtschaftsraum"). 
In former centuries it was the most important one in the world. The 
"southern expansion" ("Siiderweiterung") of the EEC cannot answer all the 
problems of this region. There are legal-economic contacts between 
Greece, the new EEC member, and Spain and Portugal, the EEC candi-
dates, but it would be better to have more of them. 
Another region of this kind is, of course, Latin America. Its legal-eco-
nomic integrative process is a firmly established part of modern interna-
tional law. Again, it seems that it would be better to have more of this 
integration, by way of coordination and harmonization. Unlike the Medi-
terranean countries, Latin America does not have to cope with a multitude 
of languages. The Spanish language links all Central and South American 
nations except Brazil to Spain; the Portuguese language links Brazil to Por-
tugal. The importance of these two European countries as possible catalysts 
for a coordination of legal-economic concepts and policies cannot be over-
looked. There are regular contacts between Spanish and Latin American 
lawyers and economists, and there will be more.57 
The Mediterranean and the Latin American regions have much in com-
mon: positively, with respect to their average economic structure, many of 
them are developing countries, and negatively, in their opposition role in 
relation to the "northern industrialized countries" in Europe and North 
America and in a resulting "Third World" feeling. The substantial identity 
of interests in these two regions is striking indeed. Even more striking, if it 
comes to details, is the role Spain plays within these two regions. She be-
longs to both regions: by geography to the Mediterranean; and by lan-
guage, tradition, and influence to Latin America. Only slightly different is 
REGIONALISMUS IN EUROPA (Reports of the Bayerische Landeszentrale far politische 
Bildungsarbeit, 3 vols., 1978, 1981, 1983). 
56. See notes 3, 13 supra (on the possibility of a "zweispuriges System"). 
57. These contacts between Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American lawyers - for exam-
ple in the Instituto hispano-luso-americano-filipino de Direito International Privado in Lisbon 
- are reminiscent of the meetings between Scandinavian lawyers that have been taking place 
since the 1880s, influencing the harmonization of Scandinavian law. The peculiar place of the 
Latin American countries within the Third World, due to the old ties to Spain, Portugal, and 
Europe in general, is convincingly set forth in Wagner de Reyna, Entwicklung und Kullur, 
ENTWICKLUNG UNO ZUSAMMENARBEIT, No. 4, 1983, at 4, 6. 
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the position of Portugal. In particular, the interregional importance of 
Spain can hardly be overestimated. 
CONCLUSION 
UN bodies like the proposed Seabed Authority do not offer a way out of 
the present crisis in Third World trade partnership relations. Rather, this 
problem should be addressed substantively through an extraterritorial anti-
trust approach including transfer of technology control, and methodologi-
cally through a regional approach consisting of harmonized national rules 
paying due attention to UN programs and guidelines. 
